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ABSTRACT 
 
Many cases have impacted how today’s independent auditor does the job of expressing an opinion 
on financial statements.  Students taking auditing classes memorize the names and dates of the 
some of these cases, but rarely learn the facts of the cases or appreciate why the cases were so 
critical to advancing modern auditing standards.  McKesson & Robbins is one of the earliest of 
these cases.  Spanning more than a decade, two continents, two generations and at least four 
surnames, this case clearly shows students that fraud is not limited to today’s corporations and 
that there is, indeed, little that is new under the sun. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Bootlegger, businessman, smuggler, spy – Guess, oh, guess just who am I? 
Bootlegger, businessman, smuggler, spy – Musica, Johnson, Costa, Coster, who am I? 
 
“Beyond any doubt the S.E.C. case which had the greatest impact on the public accounting profession was that 
involving McKesson & Robbins, Incorporated.”1 
 
any cases have impacted how today‟s independent auditor does the job of expressing an opinion on 
financial statements.  Students taking auditing classes memorize the names and dates of the some 
of these cases, but rarely learn the facts of the cases or appreciate why the cases were so critical to 
advancing modern auditing standards.  McKesson & Robbins is one of the earliest of these cases.  Spanning more 
than a decade, two continents, two generations and at least four surnames, this case clearly shows students that fraud 
is not limited to today‟s corporations and that there is, indeed, little that is new under the sun. 
 
Prior to 1939, auditors generally did not observe the counting of inventory.  Instead auditors supported 
inventory value through written representation.  By arguing that they were not qualified to identify and measure 
inventory, auditors were able to avoid responsibility for quantities and existence of inventory.   In the McKesson & 
Robbins Co. fraud of 1939, auditors, following generally accepted auditing standards of the day, failed to catch 
approximately $10 million of fictitious inventories and receivables that were overstated by more than $8 million.  As 
a direct result of this fraud, two audit procedures - observing inventory and confirming receivables - were added to 
what were considered acceptable auditing procedures for the day under the guidelines of American Institute of 
Accountants‟ 1936 bulletin, Examination of Financial Statements by Independent Public Accountants. [Note that the 
term “auditor” was not used at this time.]  
 
SAS No. 1 (AU 331), Receivables and Inventories, states that “…it is ordinarily necessary for the 
independent auditor to be present at the time of count and, by suitable observation, tests, and inquiries, satisfy 
himself respecting the effectiveness of the methods of inventory-taking and the measure of reliance which may be 
placed upon the client‟s representations about the quantities and physical condition of the inventories.” 
 
                                                 
1 Rappaport, p. 41. 
M 
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Today, if inventories are material and observation is practical, the auditor must observe the counting of 
inventory.  If this audit step is not taken, the auditor bears the burden of justifying the audit opinion.   SAS No. 1 
does not make the auditor responsible for actually counting inventory; the client is the party responsible for 
supervising and counting the inventory.  The auditor, however, must satisfy himself that inventory is correct. 
 
SAS No. 1 (AU 331) also requires the confirmation of receivables.   SAS 67(AU 330), The Confirmation 
Process, provides additional guidance on the confirmation process and states, in part, that “confirmation of accounts 
receivable is a generally accepted auditing procedure.”  Confirmation of accounts receivable is required, except in 
one of the following three situations:  
 
1. When accounts receivable are not material to financial statements,  
2. When confirmations would not be effective (i.e., the auditor expects an inadequate response rate to make 
confirmation meaningful), or 
3. When confirmations are not necessary to reduce audit risk to an acceptably low level for the audit 
assertions.   The auditor may deem that the inherent and control risk are sufficiently low that evidence from 
other substantive tests and results of analytical procedures provide sufficient audit evidence to allow the 
auditor to form an opinion on accounts receivable  
 
One case from the 1930s plays a paramount role in causing these two procedures to become part of 
generally accepted auditing standards.  The man behind the case leading to these additional requirements for the 
auditing process was in immigrant, smuggler, spy, convicted felon, bootlegger, prominent businessman, recipient of 
a presidential pardon, and almost a candidate for President of the United States. 
 
THE EARLY YEARS – PHILIP MUSICA – THE ITALIAN CHEESE FRAUD 
 
Philip Musica was born in the squalid neighborhood of Mulberry Bend in New York‟s lower east side on 
May 12, 1884, to Antonio and Assunta Mauro Musica.  Papa Antonio had been a barber in Italy when Mama 
Assunta learned that she was pregnant.  Determined that her child would not be born into the poverty of Italy, the 
Musicas immigrated to America.  At first, Mr. Musica was content to barber in New York, but Mrs. Musica, who 
seemed to be the driving force of the family, pushed until her husband opened a small grocery selling cheeses and 
other imported food items desired by other Italian immigrants of the neighborhood.   
 
Young Philip held himself aloof from the gangs of youth that roved the Mulberry Bend.  At age 14, he 
dropped out of school and joined his father in the grocery business.  He quickly learned the import-export business, 
and A. Musica & Son soon became such a successful Italian grocery that Philip was able to put a down payment on 
a mansion Brooklyn, move his family from the squalor of the Lower East Side, become a star of New York society, 
and begin thinking of himself as “a Diamond Jim Brady with taste.”2   
 
Unfortunately, not all of the family‟s fortune had come about legitimately.  In 1909, during a political 
campaign in which charges of “corruption” were hurled against the incumbent, an investigation was begun that 
uncovered bribery of customs officials by the family.  The Musicas had been paying bribes to have their incoming 
fine Italian cheeses recorded at a fraction of their actual weights allowing the family to avoid tariffs and to make 
profits far above those of their competitors.  On October 29, 1909, Philip and Papa Antonio were indicted for fraud.  
Like a good son, Philip took full responsibility for the fraud in exchange for a dismissal of the charges against his 
father.  Philip was fined $5,000 and sentenced to a year in a reformatory.
3
   
 
In the reformatory, Philip held himself apart from the regular prison population and, although the details of 
how it was accomplished are scant, Philip walked out of prison five and one-half months after he went in with his 
sentence commuted by none other than William Howard Taft, President of the United States.             
 
                                                 
2 Keats, pg. 14 
3 Flaa, p. 6. 
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THE HAIR FRAUD 
 
The Musicas returned to the grocery business but avoided the “smelly” cheese business that had given rise 
to the recent troubles.  Without the lucrative cheese business and probably with prodding from Mama Assunta, the 
family looked for other ways to increase the family fortune.  With Papa Antonio‟s earlier work in barbering, it might 
not be surprising the Musicas turned to human hair.  The high, fancy women‟s hair fashions of the time required 
human hair add-ons – all made from imported hair.  After all, why sell pasta at 16 cents a pound at A. Musica & Son 
Grocery when human hair brought $80 a pound?
4
   
 
After the formation of the United States Hair Company, the family wealth began to grow again.  The family 
moved to a larger house, while Philip obtained a suite in midtown Manhattan for his personal use.  But this still was 
not enough for young Philip. 
 
Mama Assunta returned to Naples with letters of introduction and set about courting Italian bankers from 
whom she obtained large loans using her invoices for human hair as collateral.  This would have been fine, except 
that the crates of hair covered by the invoices contained barbershop sweepings rather than the long lengths of human 
hair needed for the fashions of the day.  Philip, in the meantime, set up offices around the world to deal in human 
hair and borrowed money in the U.S. against non-existent inventories of human hair.
5
  Like, the crates of human hair 
collateralizing the loans in Naples, these offices were mere facades, mail drops creating paper transactions for 
fictitious transactions.  Within four months, the United States Hair Company was begun with $2,000,000 in assets, 
including $600,000 in non-existent human hair.  The company, and the fictitious hair inventory, continued to grow 
worldwide through phony transactions.   
 
Philip “had discovered a principle that was to be promulgated a quarter-century later by a writer named 
Adolf Schickelgruber (who used the pen name of A. Hitler): The big lie goes marching on where the tiny fib falls 
flat on its face…a timorously presented rubber check for $10 will arouse the bank president, the board of directors, 
the American Bankers Association, and the United States Treasury, whereas a bold request for a half-million dollars 
in credit will evoke only a quick and smiling assent.”6 
  
On March 11, 1913, five months after the company was first listed on Wall Street, the plot began to 
unravel.  Philip at first tried to use his own funds to prop up the business.  However, when he realized that things 
were impossible, he took invoices for $370,000 worth of human hair to a bank and asked for a loan to cover the 
entire amount.  The bank gave him only $25,000.  He then took duplicates of the invoices to several other banks and 
received additional loans from many.  He also stopped by several jewelry stores to pick up a fortune in diamonds 
“on approval.”  With money and jewels in hand, Philip and the family prepared to flee.  One alert bank noted that 
the invoices supporting the loans had been tampered with and an investigation of the crates of hair revealed the 
sweepings.  Instead of $370,000, the inventory was worth only $250.  Even when confronted by the bankers, Philip 
was able to buy some time by blaming unscrupulous foreign suppliers and promising to clear the matter up in a few 
days.   
 
Four days later, on March 15
th
, Philip and the family fled.  The banks waited two more days before acting 
enabling the Musicas to stay one step ahead of the law as they fled from New York to New Orleans where they were 
already aboard a ship bound for Honduras when the police finally caught up with them.  Back in New York, auditors 
tried to trace the lost assets, but the tangled web of finances Philip had woven hid many of them.  It was suspected 
that diamonds on loan from New York jewelers had been sent to Mama Assunta in Naples, but she vigorously 
denied this allegation.  However, she did remain in Naples with three of Philip‟s younger brothers and sisters until 
everything settled down in New York.   
 
                                                 
4 Keats, pp. 17-19 
5 Flaa, p. 6. 
6 Keats, pg. 22. 
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Once again, Philip accepted full responsibility for the fraud and asked for clemency for the rest of the 
family.  Now 28 years of age, he blamed corrupt foreign firms for the problems and said the family was fleeing only 
to gain time to repay all the creditors.  Charges against Philip‟s father and two brothers were dropped; Papa Antonia 
suffered a heart attack and died shortly afterward; Philip went to the Tombs. 
 
The Tombs was not exactly prison.  Rather, it was a place where prisoners awaited sentencing.   As before, 
Philip was determined to remain apart from the regular prison population.  He became a stool pigeon for the district 
attorney.  Politics again came into play, and Philip, in an effort to gain favor with authorities, doctored a petition by 
the prisoners that probably resulted in the death by execution of a prisoner.  While in the Tombs, Philip also 
“befriended” another prisoner Hans Schmidt, a fake priest accused of murdering a servant girl during a botched 
abortion and sawing her into pieces that he could carry and drop into the Hudson River.  Philip coached Hans on 
how to behave in public so that he might be able to use an insanity defense.  Musica then told the prosecution that 
Hans had been studying the insanity defense in law books.  Hans was executed, and Philip left the Tombs with a 
suspended sentence. 
 
THE SPY – WILLIAM JOHNSON 
 
Using the name William Johnson, Philip now became a special investigator for the Attorney General of 
New York.  Once again, Musica sought to please those with power and, using bribery and perjury, helped convict 
Joseph Cohen, an innocent man, of murder.  The plot came to light, and Philip was indicted for subornation of 
perjury.  Using his personal charm, he kept his case from ever going to trial.  Joseph Cohen, having been within 
seven minutes of death by electrocution was freed from prison only to be shot and killed in his own doorway by 
three men who were never caught.   
 
FRANK COSTA AND ADELPHI PHARMACEUTICAL  
 
In 1919, when Philip was 34 years old.  Ever the entrepreneur, he embarked on a new enterprise.  When the 
18th Amendment was ratified by Nebraska on January 16, 1919, Prohibition was on the way.  The Volstead Act was 
passed in October 1919 to enforce the amendment.  President Woodrow Wilson vetoed the Act, but Congress passed 
it over the President‟s veto.  On January 17, 1920, the United States went dry.  It was now against the law to buy, 
sell, or drink intoxicating beverages.  Illegal stills and speakeasies became sources of immense revenues as 
Americans looked for liquor outside the law.  
 
Philip, now operating under the name of Frank B. Costa, entered into a partnership with a man he had met 
in prison and began Adelphi Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company in Brooklyn.  On the surface Adelphi 
Pharmaceutical manufactured hair tonic and cosmetic.  For these products, the company was able to legally draw 
5,000 gallons of denatured alcohol a month.  If customers, in turn, distilled the alcohol from the hair tonic and other 
products, which could then be sold as bootleg whiskey, clearly Adelphi was not at fault.   
 
While Adelphi was proceeding at full capacity, Philip turned his attentions elsewhere.  He met and fell for 
the wife of a Wall Street investor, Edward Hubbard.  Methodically, Philip set out first to destroy Edward‟s business 
and then to drive Edward himself to a mental breakdown.  Once Hubbard was out of the picture, Philip would be 
free to woo and wed Edward‟s former wife, Carol.  Carol, who appeared to be a good wife to Edward and an 
innocent bystander to what was happening, would remain a faithful wife to Philip for the rest of his life, content to 
remain at their home in Fairfield and raise prize-winning chow dogs. 
 
Having won his beloved, Philip now cut his ties with Adelphi Pharmaceutical.  He informed his partners 
that he was withdrawing.  When they refused to allow this knowing that they were unable to carry on the business as 
successfully without Costa, a note informing the federal enforcers of the Volstead Act that the company‟s products 
were being diverted to illegal alcohol quickly brought the company to its knees leaving Philip to follow other 
pursuits. 
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DR. F. DONALD COSTER AND MCKESSON & ROBBINS 
 
In 1923, Philip, now using the name of Dr. F. Donald Coster (supposedly with a Ph.D. and MD from the 
University of Heidelberg), along with George Dietrich (actually brother George Musica), and P. Horace Girard 
(brother Robert Musica) began Girard & Co. in Mount Vernon, New York.  One of Girard‟s largest subsidiaries 
would be W.W. Smith & Co. under the leadership of George Vernard (brother Arthur Musica).  
 
Staying with what President Coster knew was a proven success, Girard & Co. produced products such as 
hair tonics, colognes, and furniture polish that had high alcohol content enabling Girard & Co. to draw 5,200 gallons 
of alcohol a month.  Some products had as much as a 90% alcohol content, which made them highly desirable to 
bootleggers.  Other products were of such high quality that they could compete with other legitimate products in 
drugstores, retail outlets and pharmaceutical distributors.  The company did well on paper even though perhaps only 
half of its actual revenues were reflected on the books.     Girard requested a larger alcohol allotment.  Enforcers of 
the Volstead Act found the records of the company to be in perfect order.   The company‟s alcohol allowance was 
increased to 25,000 gallons a month.        
 
Price, Waterhouse & Co. (the predecessor of PricewaterhouseCoopers) was selected as auditor in 1925 at a 
fee of $550.  Coster (Philip) knew that auditors did not examine accounts receivable and inventories directly but 
rather relied on paper documents such as purchase orders, customer orders, receiving reports, and shipping 
documents.
7
   
 
Looking to expand Girard, Coster met Julian F. Thomson, a banker with Bond & Goodwin.  (Thompson 
would later become the treasurer of McKesson & Robbins, Inc.)  Thompson was impressed not just with Girard, but 
also with Coster himself.  With a move to the Gold Coast of Fairfield County in Connecticut, Coster found more and 
more top banking officers coming under his spell.  He entertained them aboard his 125-foot yacht, the Carolita, and 
they lent Girard Company money and invested their personal funds in its common stock.  They adored Coster, and 
“[a]s a reward he gave them profits in such gratifying ratio to their investments that they were too dazzled to be 
curious.  They had discovered a singular genius, and their faith in him was faith in themselves.  They clasped him to 
their bosoms and invited him to join their most exclusive clubs.”8        
 
Dr. Coster turned his attentions to his personal life.  He purchased an 18-room mansion in Fairfield.  He 
decorated it with a life-size portrait of Theodore Roosevelt, a library, an Oriental room, a sun room, a poolroom with 
a slot machine, wine cellars stocked with “pre-Prohibition American ryes and bourbons, available only on 
physicians‟ prescriptions,”9 and a recreation room that could seat one hundred guests.  Next, Dr. Coster married his 
love, Carol Jenkins Hubbard, on May 1, 1926.  For his marriage license, Philip altered only a few facts, including 
his place of residence (New York rather than Fairfield), his parents‟ name (from Antonio and Assunta Musica to 
Anthony and Assumption Girard Coster), and their place of birth (from Italy to the United States).
10
      
   
As with Adelphi, Girard & Co. soon grew too small for Dr. Coster.  He began to eye McKesson & Robbins, 
a nearly 100 year old pharmaceutical company.  Though old and respected, by 1924, disagreement had grown 
among the heirs of John McKesson Jr., and the company had split into New York Quinine and Chemical Works and 
McKesson & Robbins.  The McKesson & Robbins portion had dropped its distribution business and the volume of 
the company‟s business began a downward slide until the owners reached the point where they would accept any 
reasonable offer for the firm.  Coster bought the firm for $1,000,000 in the fall of 1926, moved it to Fairfield, and 
then sold $1,650,000 of stock in his new company – McKesson & Robbins of Connecticut.    
 
                                                 
7 Keats, pp. 19-72. 
8 Keats, p. 76. 
9 Keats, p. 80. 
10 Clearly, Philip Musica was not satisfied with his history.  In 1935, he had a birth certificate filed on which he changed his 
birthplace (from New York to Washington, D.C.), his mother‟s name (from Assunta or Assumption to Marie).  A year later, when 
named to Who’s Who, his parents became Frank Donald and Marie Girard Coster, his date of marriage was pushed back five 
years to a point two years before his wife had divorced her first husband, and her maiden name changed from Jenkins to 
Schieffelin. (Keats, pp. 80-81.) 
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THE DIETRICHS AND THE FRAUD 
 
Repeating a familiar pattern, McKesson & Robbins quickly became a family affair.  George Dietrich 
(brother George) was named assistant treasurer and Robert Dietrich (brother Robert) directed the shipping 
department.  The New York office of McKesson & Robbins was located in a building owned by Assumption Coster 
(Mama Assunta).  George Vernard (brother Arthur) played critical roles as well, becoming head of Philip‟s private 
bank, Manning & Co., and remaining head of W.W. Smith & Co.
11
   Much of McKesson & Robbins‟s fraudulent 
crude drug activities took place in the Brooklyn office of W.W. Smith where “…Arthur Musica prepared all 
correspondence for the fictitious companies with which the McKesson corporation was supposedly dealing… 
[using] …a number of different typewriters, each of which was used for the typing of documents for one specific 
dummy corporation.”12   To maintain distance between the companies, Most of the documents prepared in the 
Brooklyn office were then sent to an “office” in Montreal where a typist opened each piece of incoming 
correspondence, placed it in another envelope, and mailed it to Philip at McKesson & Robbins in New York.  Philip, 
as Dr. Coster, answered the correspondence and routed it back to Montreal.  Five other associated fictitious crude 
drug wholesalers and a fictitious bank likewise were created in Canada and operated in a similar manner. 
 
The bootlegging operations of Girard & Co. also continued under McKesson & Robbins.  Its tincture of 
iodine was a particularly prized product.  However, an iodine trust in Chile existed that made it difficult for Coster 
to receive the iodine he needed on the best terms.  Philip set out to break the monopolistic hold the Chilean trust had 
on iodine.  Successful in that venture, he proceeded to break the quinine monopoly in the Netherlands and the 
bismuth monopoly in Bolivia.  Having shown his ability to play in the international markets, Dr. Coster was ready 
for the final big deal – a corporation trading internationally in crude drugs, McKesson & Robbins, Ltd.  In less than 
one year, Dr. Coster had turned McKesson & Robbins around from a company losing money to one showing a 
$600,000 profit including the effects of hefty receivables and inventories in the Canadian subsidiaries.  
 
By 1927, McKesson & Robbins was a $4,000,000 company.  The stock market was booming.  Dr. Coster 
was ready for the next step – Wall Street.  He called Julian Thompson, the banker who had been so awed with Dr. 
Coster when they had first met in Connecticut.  Thompson was asked to approach regional drug distributors to 
consolidate their operations into the McKesson & Robbins distribution operations in exchange for stock in 
McKesson & Robbins of Maryland.  Coster promised economies of scale from the consolidation; however, he did 
not mention that there was also consolidation of power into his hands. 
 
George Dietrich (brother George) handled all correspondence from the company‟s Canadian subsidiary.  
Every morning he opened all letters, even those for his superior, Julian Thompson, supposedly because George was 
an ardent stamp collector and wanted all those colorful foreign stamps.
13
  On paper, the subsidiary traded millions of 
dollars worth of crude drugs worldwide, but no drugs ever changed hands.  W.W. Smith & Company made “sales” 
to fictitious companies around the world and notified McKesson & Robbins of the sales and shipments where an 
invoice was typed.  The invoices were sent to Brother George for mailing and were probably destroyed by him.  
W.W. Smith “collected” on the invoice and “deposited” the funds in Philip‟s fictitious Canadian bank, Manning & 
Company.  The bank notified the accounting department of McKesson & Robbins of the collections and deposits so 
that proper accounting entries could be made.  Of course, it was impossible for the Canadian office of W.W. Smith 
to funnel back any of the funds to McKesson & Robbins for use in regular operating activities since no cash had 
ever been collected.  This failure to send back funds was explained by the build-up of fictitious inventories in 
Canadian warehouses.
 14
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Keats, pp. 85-95. 
12 Flaa, p. 11. 
13 Keats, pp. 85-108. 
14 Flaa, pp. 11-14. 
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THE BEGINNING OF THE END 
 
In 1928, Americans were riding high, but the fall was coming.  Warnings went unheeded by “…people who 
arose each morning confident that they would be millionaires by suppertime.”15  
 
Dr. F. Donald Coster had accounts with several brokers in several names including an “uncle” P. Horace 
Girard.  Coster offered 20,000 shares of dying Uncle Horace‟s shares to two investment bankers for $500,000.  
Seeing others whose investments of as little as $20,000 with Coster in Girard & Co. in 1926 had grown to more than 
$1,000,000 in only two short years, the bankers were delighted and no one seemed to notice either that the name on 
the stock was not Uncle Horace or that the check went to Dr. Coster personally.
16
        
   
Suddenly McKesson & Robbins was charged with violating the Clayton Antitrust Act because the 
acquisition of the smaller wholesale drug firms had reduced competition and “created a monopoly in certain drugs 
and proprietary medicines.” 17  As had happened so mysteriously before in Philip‟s life, as suddenly as they had 
appeared, the Federal Trade Commission charges were just as quickly dropped. 
 
Then came Terrible Tuesday, October 29, 1929.  Coster was worth an estimated $6,500,000 at that time.  
Like other investors, Coster was invested on the margin and faced margin calls.  He had George Dietrich (brother 
George at McKesson & Robbins) issue cash to W.W. Smith (George Venard, aka brother Arthur) supposedly to 
cover purchases of crude drugs by the Canadian subsidiary.  Instead of covering purchased, Dr. Coster used 
McKesson & Robbins funds in the amount of $634,000 to cover margin calls on his private accounts.   
  
Although many of his actions were fraudulent, Coster worked tirelessly to keep McKesson & Robbins 
solvent.  The company shuddered in the wake of the stock market‟s freefall, but thanks in part to the fake 
receivables and inventories of the Canadian subsidiary, the company stood.  Coster also looked for other ways to 
prop up McKesson & Robbins during these difficult times – some legitimate, others less so.  He bought drugs from 
bankrupt pharmaceutical companies at low prices then booked them in inventory at highly inflated prices.  He used 
the press to plant favorable articles about the company.  Without using scarce McKesson & Robbins cash, he 
cornered a 25 year supply of cod liver oil in exchange for stock.  In addition, because Prohibition continued and 
America remained dry, the bootlegging went on. 
 
The Canadian operations also continued.  Paperwork was accurate and detailed.  Basically, when a 
purchase was planned, McKesson & Robbins, upon receipt of the proper paperwork – purchase order, invoice, 
receipt tick, and debit memo from Manning & Co. (Coster‟s private bank) that the vendor had been paid – would 
issue the check.  Sales were likewise supported on paper; the difference was that the receipts from the customer 
were in the forms of increases in receivables, increases in inventory, or payments to the Manning account.  W.W. 
Smith was paid a basis fee of $18,000 per year plus 0.0075% of sales.  All monies, an estimated $120,000,000 over 
ten years, however, ultimately moved in and out of the hands of Philip Musica.   
  
Yet all the carefully documented transactions were a hoax.  How, one wonders, could the auditors have 
missed this for so long?  No one seemed to notice that “… there were not enough Himalayan musk deer in the world 
to fill the orders placed…” or “… that vanilla beans are shipped in tins and not in 200-pound bags like lima 
beans…” or “…that the amount of procaine or iodoform supposedly stored in Canadian warehouses would supply 
the entire United States for years…” or that merchandise was moved “…from South America to Australia and China 
„by truck.‟” 18   
 
The SEC was later to ask similar questions and to state: 
 
                                                 
15 Keats, p. 110. 
16 Keats, pp. 75-111. 
17 Keats 111. 
18 Keats, pp. 112-119, quote from p. 119. 
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The firm of Price Waterhouse & Co. for 14 years served as independent public accountants for F. Donald Coster’s 
[Philip Musica’s] enterprises.  Within [the] range of the procedures which they followed there were numerous 
circumstances which, if they had been recognized and carefully investigated by resourceful auditors, should have 
revealed the gross inflation in the accounts.  We are convinced that despite collusion and skillfully prepared false 
documents [,] these items repeated themselves to such an extent as to have permitted detection of the gross inflation 
by alert auditors intent upon knowing the truth about the foreign crude drug operations.
19
 
   
Perhaps part of the answer lies in a 1933 letter from Coster to Price Waterhouse Co.: 
 
Incidentally, our comptroller has called my attention to the fact that payments for auditing fees paid by us since 
organization to your good firm have reached the million mark.  I am very glad of it and feel that among the major 
expenses incidental to mergers and consolidations only in auditing did our company really get its money’s worth.20 
 
When Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected in 1932, Coster, an avowed Republican, could see the end of 
prohibition on the horizon.  Knowing that the profits of illegal liquor would soon come to an end, Coster prepared 
for the coming change.  He sent Julian Thompson abroad to secure contracts for the finest wines and liquors.  On 
December 5, 1933, when Utah ratified the 21st Amendment that repealed the 18th Amendment and the Volstead 
Act, Coster and McKesson & Robbins were ready – ready with 66 distributors that had come on board and ready 
with bootleggers who were ready to become dealers in legitimate liquor. Sales boomed.  
 
Over the next year or so, there were rumblings against Coster.  Some stockholders grew weary of his 
autocratic control of the company; some questioned why the profits of the Canadian subsidiary were always plowed 
back into inventory rather than being returned to the United States.  Coster withstood the storms and retained control 
of the company. 
 
One of the strangest events in the history of McKesson & Robbins was the Lee-Enfield rifle affair.  
Somehow Coster arranged to purchase hundreds of thousands of World War I surplus rifles stored in government 
warehouses.  Although there was talk of possible sales to Chiang Kai-shek, Benito Mussolini, Forces in Spain, and 
the Mexican government, no one seems certain of whatever became of the rifles.
21
  After his death, a federal 
investigation placed in doubt the possibility that Coster would have been able to purchase the rumored 250,000 rifles 
and the matter subsequently was dropped.
22
 
 
THE END DRAWS NEARER  
 
What happened to bring down the façade that was the Canadian subsidiary?  In 1937, Thompson began to 
look askance at the operation.  It was the most profitable division of the company, yet all profits were plowed back 
into crude drug inventories.  Receivables and inventories combined for $18,000,000 of McKesson & Robbins total 
of $80,000,000 in assets.   
 
Thompson asked Coster to bring some of the profits back to reduce the company debt. As would so often 
be his response in the future, Coster rejected Thompson‟s request.    
 
A decrease in inventories should result in an increase in cash or receivables when the inventories were sold. 
Since those inventories were fictitious and their decrease would result in no cash to return to McKesson & Robbins, 
Coster was in a desperate position.  Thompson approached other directors who chose to attack the problem by 
voting to reduce all company inventories by $4,000,000 including a $1,000,000 reduction in the crude drug 
                                                 
19 Pollack and Sporkin, pp. 10-11 quoting from Report on Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 in the Matter of McKesson & Robbins, Inc. (1940), p. 438-439. 
20 Keats, p. 119. 
21 Keats, pp. 123-152. 
22 “Coster Arms Deal…”, p. 12. 
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inventories in the Canadian warehouses.  Coster seemed to accept the board‟s decision, but by the following year, 
the Canadian inventories were even larger.   
 
During the summer, Thompson suggested that he would visit the Canadian warehouses while on vacation 
with his family in Poland Springs, Maine.  While Coster seemed to agree to this action, he called Thompson back to 
Fairfield every few days for meetings.  His suspicions aroused, Thompson began to dig.  He found that Coster had 
not reduced the crude-drug inventories and that there was no insurance on the inventory.  Coster tried to explain this 
away by saying that W.W. Smith insured the inventory.  Coster said the interest in the subsidiary was an attempt to 
take his job as president away. 
 
Thompson‟s suspicions were heightened when he noticed that the fees to W.W. Smith were paid by 
McKesson & Robbins rather than from the profits of the Canadian subsidiary.  As treasurer, Thompson had seen the 
Dun & Bradstreet reports on W.W. Smith each year as part of the audit report.  He requested a copy of the latest 
Dun & Bradstreet report on the firm from a New York attorney.  Imagine his surprise when he learned Dun & 
Bradstreet had no reports on the company.  Thompson then went to Price, Waterhouse and got file copies of the last 
two Dun & Bradstreet reports on W.W. Smith, which, incidentally, the auditors indicated had been supplied by 
George Dietrich.  Returning to Dun & Bradstreet with the photocopies, Thompson learned that the copies were 
forgeries.  Continuing his quest, Thompson‟s inquiries in Montreal provided information that the main business of 
W.W. Smith was conducted in Liverpool while inquiries in Liverpool indicated that the main business was 
conducted in Montreal. Furthermore, bankers in both cities were unaware of the company. 
 
Events now began to move rapidly.  Thompson was ready to confront Coster again.  Coster called 
Thompson in to discuss floating a $3,000,000 bond issue.  After that discussion, Thompson turned to the problem of 
W.W. Smith.  Again, Coster brought up the prospect of a conspiracy to take away his job, but that he would get the 
records together in a day or so.  When Coster was ill the next day, Thompson set out on his own to visit the offices 
of W.W. Smith in Brooklyn.  There he found the names of both W.W. Smith and Manning on the door. Inside he 
found a receptionist and a drunken George Vernard (brother Arthur).  When Thompson left, Vernard phoned George 
Dietrich who informed Coster.  Coster ordered George to remove incriminating documents from the company safe.   
 
The following day, Thompson again faced Coster.  Coster, actually still ill with a throat infection, 
demanded that Thompson resign.  Thompson refused.  On December 5, 1938, Thompson telephone Coster and told 
him he was bringing the information to the executive committee of McKesson & Robbins as soon as possible. 
23
  
 
At almost the same time, Vincent W. Dennis, a stockholder of only a few hours, filed an action to place 
McKesson & Robbins into receivership until the question of some $20,000,000 in missing assets could be settled.  
Receivers were appointed.  They immediately placed locks on the company safe not knowing that George already 
had removed at Philip‟s command all documents of importance much earlier. 
 
The executive committee of McKesson & Robbins responded quickly by calling in the SEC and asking it to 
investigate financial statements that might possibly be fraudulent.  They then called in the senior partner of Price, 
Waterhouse who assured the worried committee members that the financial statements were in order.  Next, the 
committee contacted the New York Stock Exchange to ask that trading in McKesson & Robbins stock be halted.  
(Coster had anticipated this and had liquidated some of his holdings earlier.)  Trading of McKesson & Robbins stock 
was halted at 11:30 A.M. on December 6, 1938.  Then the committee sat and waited for Coster to make a promised 
appearance at the office.  Coster called and said he could not come.  Thompson and the others filed a petition for 
reorganization stating that “information has come to light…indicating that the inventories and accounts receivable 
relating to the crude-drug business have been overstated for a substantial period and the current position of the 
petitioner [McKesson & Robbins] as appears on the balance sheet is false and misleading.”  The petition was 
granted giving McKesson & Robbins the dubious honor of being the “first major corporation to enter reorganization 
under Chapter X of the Chandler Act….”24 
 
                                                 
23 Keats, pp. 163-174. 
24 Keats, pp. 181-182. 
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The receivers who were appointed, tried to calm fears of the public regarding the solvency of McKesson & 
Robbins.  The executive committee went to court asking that the receivers be removed since they were from 
Connecticut and were probably under the influence of Coster.
25
  The judge agreed and two new trustees were 
appointed.  The trustees were to: 
 
1. …prepare a reorganization plan acceptable to the creditors, the stockholders, Judge Coxe, and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
2. …run the business without interference by the stockholders as long as the firm remained in 
reorganization. 
3. …recover all missing assets.26 
  
Since the financial statements showed assets of $86,500,000; liabilities of $76,250,000; and that missing 
assets were expected to be $10,000,000, it appeared that the company was solvent.  A federal judge tied up accounts 
of Coster and his wife, Carol, valued at approximately $100,000 each. 
 
Everyone jumped into the fray – at least eight separate investigations-federal, state, and city, were 
simultaneously on-going.  When the dust had settled, Price, Waterhouse, Coster‟s auditor since as early as 1925 
admitted to not having visited any of the crude drug warehouses in Canada even though the inventories there 
constituted nearly one-eighth of McKesson & Robbins‟s assets.  None of the prestigious firms with which the 
Canadian subsidiaries of McKesson & Robbins were supposed to have been doing business had any records of any 
transactions with the company.  The fraud had been perpetuated by the Musicas using a series of mail-drop 
“warehouses” staffed by ladies paid as little as $7.50 per week. 
 
On December 12
th
, Thompson and the board called on Coster and George Dietrich to resign.  This Coster 
could not do; he had spent too much of himself developing the persona of F. Donald Coster to surrender to his 
enemies.  On December 13
th
, an agent of the SEC asked for the arrest of F. Donald Coster, George Dietrich, and 
George Vernard for filing false information.  Coster claimed to be too ill to leave home and come to New York.  It 
was agreed that he and brother George would surrender at Coster‟s home in Fairfield.  On December 14 th, federal 
officials, Coster‟s attorney, brother George and at least 20 reporters and photographers assembled in the library of 
Coster‟s home.  Waiving the reading of the charges, Coster and Dietrich were informed that they were under arrest.  
Both were fingerprinted and freed on $5,000 bond to be paid later in the day.  Both were charged with filing false 
information with the SEC, which, if they were found guilty, would earn them a $10,000, fine, a term of up to two 
years in prison or both. 
 
Armed with the fingerprints, the entire story now threatened to break.  An investigator in the New York 
attorney general‟s office thought he recognized Coster as William Johnson who had worked undercover with the 
attorney general‟s office in 1917 and whose real name was Philip Musica.  He also remembered Philip‟s criminal 
past.  A set of fingerprints from over 20 years earlier was found, but they were blurred and unusable.  More 
surprising (or perhaps not surprising at all), the rest of the dossier on Philip Musica in the office of the attorney 
general had disappeared.   
 
Meanwhile, other memories were jogged.  Members of the press noticed the resemblance of Coster to the 
son of an Italian immigrant who had been involved in a cheese scandal in 1909 and a human hair fraud in 1913. The 
quest was on for the true identity of F. Donald Coster.  When it seemed that the search would be unsuccessful, 
Inspector James J. Donovan remembered that there were duplicate files of many old cases in a station house on the 
lower east side.  A six-hour search finally yielded results and a few minutes before midnight on December 15, 
Inspector Donovan announced to the press “that Dr. F. Donald Coster, the financial wizard and president of the vast 
McKesson & Robbins pharmaceutical empire, and Philip Musica, the twice guilty swindler from Mulberry Bend, 
were one and the same person.”27  
 
                                                 
25 Keats, pp.175-182. 
26 Keats, p. 182. 
27 Keats, pp. 182-200, quote from p. 200. 
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Alone in his study of his home the following morning, Philip Musica did again what he had done so often 
before.  Claiming loyalty to the company rather than personal enrichment as the reason for his actions, Philip wrote 
the story of the McKesson & Robbins scandal admitting to inflating profits in order to save the company, accepting 
full blame for everything that had happened, and absolving everyone else from any responsibility.  He placed the 
letter in an envelope for his attorney. 
 
Meanwhile, Carol, Philip‟s wife, fearing what he might do had enlisted the aid of the butler and gardener to 
hide all the guns in the house.  When the gardener found some of the guns he had hidden had been removed, he 
reported this to Ms. Coster.  Carol, in turn, begged her husband to turn the guns over to her.  Coster refused saying 
that he needed them in case “that two-faced Thompson” showed up. 
 
The next morning Philip arose, dressed in a bathrobe, and placed a revolved in the pocket.  He wandered 
through the house for hours drinking highballs.  A few minutes before noon a call came from brother George‟s 
house that George was under arrest and federal agents were headed to Philip‟s house.  Philip went upstairs to a 
window where he could watch the agents come up the driveway.  The family‟s St. Bernard began to bark at the 
approach of strangers and Carol awoke and went downstairs.  Philip removed the revolver from the bathrobe pocket 
and placed it against his head.  At 12:09 on Friday, December 16, 1938, a federal marshal rang the doorbell and 
Philip pulled the trigger. The president of McKesson & Robbins was dead.  By the end of the day the remaining 
Musica brothers would be under arrest.     
 
THE AFTERMATH 
 
When trading in McKesson & Robbins stock was resumed, the effect of all these events was apparent in the 
stock price.  The stock, which had been at 7 ½ before trading was suspended, fell to 50 cents. The proud old 
company was the subject of rumors and allegations.  The story of the Enfield rifles led to stories of meetings with 
foreign leaders and financing of foreign wars.   
 
As time passed, under new leadership and in the turbulent prewar economy, McKesson & Robbins 
recovered and became profitable once more.  But the story of F. Donald Coster went on.   Stories of a diary and a 
“little brown book” surfaced.  The book was suppose to contain information on police, politicians, as well as 
underworld figures like Al Capone and Dutch Schultz who had been blackmailing Coster leading to his need for 
funds.  It was rumored that Coster was paying as much as $25,000 per year to keep quiet those who had known him 
in his earlier lives as Philip Musica or Frank Costa.
28
 
 
Eventually interest in the “little brown book” waned as the trials began with the prosecution indicting only 
nine people, including the three Musica brothers, in the swindle.  Six of the defendants pled guilty; three went to 
trial.  Despite nearly two tons of documents, the prosecution case was weak   The most important witness, Julian 
Thompson, who had initially sponsored Dr. Coster and then had been the first to seriously doubt him, became 
severely upset by the situation.  He finally weakened to the point that he caught a cold that developed into 
pneumonia, and died on April 21, 1939, after only being ill for one week.  His estate was valued at $41,000.
29
  
 
During the trial, the prosecution tried to show that Coster was “‟a small-timer of unsavory reputation who 
could not have got to first base in this huge swindle without the aid of these men [the defendants]…. Investigations 
…revealed that this was not a one-man show at all.  Coster had help, plenty of help.‟”30  The defense tried to place 
total blame on the financial wizard and show that Coster was the mastermind while the defendants were simply 
following orders and “were not intelligent enough to keep pace with Coster.”31  Testimony showed that in the last 
year of Coster‟s leadership, McKesson & Robbins was actually profitable based on its $150,000,000 of legitimate 
sales and only $19,000,000 in fictitious sales. 
 
                                                 
28 Sifakis, p. 134. 
29 Keats, pp. 200-228. 
30 Keats, pp. 231. 
31 Keats, pp. 232. 
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The trial lasted ten weeks, the charge to the jury lasted two hours; the jury deliberated thirteen hours and 
reached a verdict on two of the nine defendants.    Rowley W. Phillips and Horace Merwin, both Connecticut 
bankers were found not guilty on all counts.  Forty-five minutes later, John H. McGloon, the comptroller of 
McKesson and Robbins was found guilty on one of 13 counts.  For violation of the Securities and Exchange Act he 
was sentenced to one year and one day in prison and a $5,000 fine.  As for the other six defendants who had pled 
guilty, Benjamin Simon was sentenced to three years, John and Leonard Jenkins, two brothers-in-law, were 
sentenced to one year and one day, but Leonard‟s sentence was suspended.  Of the three Musica brothers, George 
Vernard (brother Arthur) was sentenced to three years, George Dietrich (brother George) to two and one-half years, 
and Robert Dietrich (brother Robert) to one and one-half years.
32
 
 
Price, Waterhouse returned over $550,000 of the fees it had collected over the years.     
 
How much was lost?  Estimates vary from $3,000,000 and $18,000,000.  Fake sales resulted in fake 
receivables, which were paid with non-existent cash that was deposited in a fake bank and then used to purchase 
fake inventories.  The cash loses seem to be limited to approximately, $150,000 in commissions and an $18,000 
annual fee paid to W.W. Smith & Co. and an annual $12,000 fee paid to Manning & Co.  Has Coster left a clue?  In 
his suicide note, Coster stated in part: 
 
McKesson should have been in receivership in 1930 and again in 1932 if its profits had not been bolstered in a 
frantic effort to save the company from the hands of the bondholder.  In other words, in the main there were cash 
sales to create a profit that did not exist, and what is missing is the alleged profits plus expenses and blackmail 
money paid to maintain it.  As God is my judge I am the victim of Wall Street blunder and blackmail in a struggle for 
honest existence.
33
 
 
So what happened to the remaining cash?  Musica‟s estate was valued at less than $40,000.34 Some people 
pointed back to blackmail based on the “little brown book”, suggesting that the names it contained were so 
prominent that the entire contents needed to be suppressed.  One former bootlegging partner, Mary Brandino, was 
actually indicted for blackmailing Musica.  When the delirious Dutch Schultz lay dying following being shot by 
assassins in New Jersey in 1935, he mentioned a Phil and a George.  Some thought he might have been speaking of 
Frank Coster and George Dietrich.  People dug at night around Fairfield, including under the St. Bernard‟s doghouse 
looking for the lost treasure of Philip Musica. There are probably those who are still looking some seventy years 
later. 
 
What of the other members of the cast of characters?  Wife Carol remarried in 1949, sold the mansion, and 
moved to Florida.  Mama Assunta was too ill to be told of her son‟s death by suicide.  She died in Long Island in 
October 1941,three years after her son.  Robert Dietrich was released from prison in August 1941.  He went to work 
for Suburban Leather Goods Company in Brooklyn and died in New Rochelle, New York, in 1956.  George Dietrich 
was released in 1942 and returned to Fairfield and worked for Grasmere Development Company.  He died on Long 
Island in 1947.  George Vernard also was released from prison in 1942 and disappeared from public view.
35
      
       
THE REACTION OF THE PROFESSION - INVENTORIES 
 
Physical examination of inventories was not required under generally accepted auditing procedures of the 
day.  In 1936, in its Examination of Financial Statements by Independent Public Accountants, The American 
Institute of Accountants (AIA), later to become the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Institute, had 
stated that the examining accountant”…must rely principally for information as to quantities, quality and condition 
upon the responsible officers and employees of the company.”  However, the Institute went on to state that the 
                                                 
32 Keats, pp. 232-236. 
33 “No Hidden Treasures,” p. 30. 
34 Flaa, p. 18. 
35 Keats, pp. 238-252. 
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accountant must “[m]ake reasonable inquiries and tests to ascertain that quantities have been carefully determined 
and that quality and condition have received due consideration.”36 
 
The examining accountants did a limited physical examination of the wholesale division, which constituted 
approximately 70% of the total inventories of McKesson & Robbins. However, the examining accountants from 
Price, Waterhouse relied entirely upon statements of management (the Musicas) and documents, including 
confirmations (all prepared by brother Arthur) for the inventories of the Canadian subsidiaries.   
In addition to the federal, state, and local investigations into the McKesson & Robbins fraud and the history of the 
Costers and the Dietrichs, the AIA adopted measures extending generally accepted auditing procedures especially in 
regard to inventories and receivables.   
 
The SEC began hearings on the case on January 5, 1939, less than three weeks after the suicide of Philip 
Musica, with the purpose of determining: 
 
1. the character, detail and scope of the audit procedures followed by Price, Waterhouse & Co. in the 
preparation of the financial statements…; 
2. the extent to which prevailing and generally accepted standards and requirements of audit procedures were 
adhered to and applied by Price Waterhouse & Co. in the preparation of the financial statements; and,  
3. the adequacy of the safeguards inhering in the generally accepted practices and principles of audit 
procedure to assure reliability and accuracy of financial statements.
37
  
 
Even with the facts of McKesson & Robbins before them and perhaps because of the exceptional amount of 
collusion among the principals of this company, many of those who testified still felt that the cost of a physical 
inspection of inventory outweighed the benefit.  However, the SEC, in its review concluded, in part, that “…the 
audits performed by Price, Waterhouse & Co. substantially conformed, in form, as to the scope and procedures 
employed, to what was generally considered mandatory during the period of the Girard-McKesson engagements.
38
     
Regarding inventories, the SEC found that the “audit program for the verification of inventories was essentially that 
which was prescribed by generally accepted auditing practices for the period…. [and] took the position that the 
verification of quantities, quality, and condition of inventories should be confined to the records….  Meticulous 
verification of the inventory was not needed in this case to discover the fraud…. We commend the action of the 
profession in subsequently adopting, as normal, procedures requiring physical contact with clients‟ inventories.39  
 
The action to which the SEC referred was the profession‟s “Extensions of Auditing Procedure” in 1941.  
The extended recommendations made by the AIA included: 
 
A. That hereafter, where the independent certified public accountant intends to report over his signature on the 
financial statements of a concern in which inventories are a material factor, it should be generally accepted 
auditing procedure that, in addition to making auditing tests and checks of the inventory accounts and 
records, he shall, wherever practicable and reasonable, be present, either in person or by his representatives, 
at the inventory-taking and by suitable observation and inquiry satisfy himself as to the effectiveness of the 
methods of inventory-taking and as to the measure of reliance which may be placed upon the client‟s 
representations as to inventories and upon the records thereof.  In this connection the independent certified 
public accountant may require physical tests of inventories to be made under his observation.  
  In cases where the inventory is determined solely by means of a physical inventory at the end of 
the accounting period (or at a date prior or subsequent thereto but within a reasonable time thereof, with 
adequate records supporting the interim changes), it will ordinarily be necessary for the foregoing 
procedures to be followed at that time…  
B. That hereafter, in the case of inventories which in the ordinary course of business are in the hands of public 
warehouses or other outside custodians, direct confirmation in writing from such custodians is acceptable 
                                                 
36 American Institute of Accountants, pp. 6-7.  
37 S.E.C., Accounting Series Releases…, p. 4. 
38 S.E.C., Accounting Series Releases…,  p. 9 
39 S.E.C., Accounting Series Releases. . ., p. 8. 
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procedure, except that, where the amount involved represents a significant proportion of the current assets 
or of the total assets of a concern, the independent certified public accountant shall make supplementary 
inquires.  
  It should be clearly understood that in undertaking these auditing procedures regarding 
inventories, the independent public accountant does so for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the 
credibility of the representations of the management regarding quantity and condition and does not hold 
himself out as a general appraiser, valuer, or expert, in materials.
40
 
 
Just as with inventories, Price, Waterhouse followed generally accepted auditing procedures of the day with 
respect to accounts receivable which did not require confirmation even if receivables were material.  In this case, the 
examining accountants accepted information from within McKesson & Robbins rather than confirming receivables 
with customers of the crude drug division.  Again, following the SEC hearings where witnesses discussed the pros 
and cons of confirming, the AIA also addressed this issue stating: 
 
That hereafter, whenever practicable and reasonable, and where the aggregate amount of notes and accounts 
receivable represents a significant proportion of the current assets or of the total assets of a concern, confirmation 
of notes and accounts receivable by direct communication with the debtors shall be regarded as generally accepted 
auditing procedure in the examination of the accounts of a concern whose financial statements are accompanied by 
an independent certified public accountant’s report…41  
 
OTHER OUTCOMES 
 
The SEC was also concerned about the method and timing of the appointment of auditors in McKesson & 
Robbins and the form of the audit report.  The officers of McKesson & Robbins generally appointed its auditors late 
in the year, which restricted the amount of time available for the audit to be performed.  The SEC recommended 
instead that: 
 
1. Election of the auditors for the current year by a vote of the stockholders at the annual meeting followed 
immediately by notice to the auditors of their appointment. 
2. Establishment of a committee to be selected from nonofficer members of the board of directors which shall 
make all company or management nominations of auditors and shall be charged with the duty of arranging 
the details of the engagement. 
3. The certificate (sometimes called short-form report or opinion) should be addressed to the stockholders. All 
other reports should be addressed to the board of directors, and copies delivered by the auditors to each 
member of the board. 
4. The auditors should be required to attend meetings of the stockholders at which their report is presented to 
answer questions thereon, to state whether or not they have been given all the information and access to all 
the books and records which they required, and to have the right to make any statement or explanation they 
desire with respect to the accounts. 
5. If for any reason the auditors do not complete the engagement and render a report thereon, they shall, 
nevertheless, render a report on the amount of work they have done and the reasons for noncompletion, 
which report should be sent by the company to all stockholders.
42
 
 
The SEC also looked at the form of certificate issued by the examining accountants at the time and 
determined that it  
 
                                                 
40 AIA, “Extensions  of Auditing Procedure,” pp. 6-7.  Another result of these extensions was that both the SEC and the AIA 
encouraged businesses to adopt a “natural business year” rather than adhering to the general practice of using a calendar.  It was 
thought that this would give a more complete fiscal picture of the business and allow accountants to distribute their workloads, 
now increased by these new inventory requirements, over the year. 
41 AIA, “Extensions of Auditing Procedure,” pp. 7-8. 
42 SEC, Accounting Series Releases…, pp. 6-7. 
Journal of Business Case Studies – July/August 2009 Volume 5, Number 4 
15 
“…should be amended to include in addition to the description of the scope of the audit a clear certification that the 
audit performed was, or was not, adequate for the purpose of expressing an independent opinion in respect to the 
financial statements. If any generally accepted procedures are omitted these should be named together with the 
reasons for their omission.  Exceptions to the scope of the audit or to the accounts must be cleared designated as 
“exceptions.”43 
 
Again, the profession responded, and the AIA recommended the use of a standard revised report to include 
both an explanation of the scope of the work done and an emphasis on the auditor‟s evaluation of the internal control 
within the company: 
 
We have examined the balance sheet of the XYZ Company as of April 30, 1939, and the statements of income and 
surplus for the fiscal year then ended, have reviewed the system of internal control and the accounting procedures of 
the company and, without making a detailed audit of the transactions, have examined or tested accounting records 
of the company and other supporting evidence by methods and to the extent we deemed appropriate.   
 
In our opinion, the accompanying balance-sheet and related statements of income and surplus present fairly the 
position of the XYZ Company at April 30, 1939, and the results of its operations for the fiscal year, in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year.
44
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Musicas are gone, but their influence continues to be felt.  This Italian immigrant family left its mark 
indelibly on the auditing profession.  Philip, George, Robert, Arthur, Papa Antonio and Mama Assunta would 
probably have been surprised at the lasting effects of their rise from cheese to hair to drug fraud. 
  
The auditing profession learned from its experiences and moved forward following McKesson & Robbins.  
The way auditors were selected changed, the scope of the auditor‟s work expanded, the audit report more carefully 
detailed what was actually done, and the cost of audits increased for clients.  In particular, the procedures for 
auditing inventories and accounts receivable were expanded.   
 
Like many other cases that were to follow, McKesson & Robbins emphasized the importance of the work 
of the auditor and the importance of auditor independence.  But the process is not complete and never will be if we 
believe a passage marked in a book, “What Interests People and Why,” found in Philip Coster‟s desk after his death: 
 
„The truth…is that no practical system has ever been devised by which the complicated finances of a large 
institution can be thoroughly checked up so that every transaction is verified, except at prohibitive time and cost.‟45    
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